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Abstract. This paper addresses the problem of safety evaluation of complex 
systems. It proposes an original and rigorous approach that integrates safety 
analysis in system engineering processes. The approach is based on system 
engineering (SE) principles and uses the famous industrial SE standard 
ANSI/EIA-632. The objective is to help designers and safety engineers in safety 
management of complex systems. For an efficient design, the model driven 
design is adopted through the definition of an information model. The system 
language SysML (System Modeling Language) is used to address requirements 
definition and their traceability towards the solution and the Verification and 
Validation (V&V) elements. This common language allows sharing information 
between the different persons involved in the design project like system 
engineer and safety engineer. 
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1   Introduction 
Complex systems are systems with numerous components, interconnections, 
interactions or interdependencies that are difficult to describe, understand, predict, 
manage, design, and/or change (Magee and de Weck, 2004). In these systems, a 
change in one part may have effects on other parts of the system.  
Most of modern systems are inherently complex (Bar-yam, 2005). This complexity 
makes the systems engineering processes (including acquisition and supply, technical 
management, system design and technical evaluation processes) more critical and 
difficult. So, performing of important system level proprieties such as reliability, 
safety and security (Avizienis and al, 2004) become difficult. Indeed, safety of 
complex systems relies heavily on the emergent properties (Levenson, 2004), (Black 
and Koopman, 2009) that result from the complex interdependencies that exist among 
the involved systems and their environments. It is necessary to address safety 
properties in an overall study, early in the design phase.   
For an effective analysis, safety processes have to consider some constraints. The 
most important ones, listed in (Guillerm and al, 2010), are: 
1. The emergent aspect of safety properties imposes to consider safety not only 
in the small but also in the large (at system level).  
2. Different persons involved in the project need to work with different views 
of the system (e.g. systems engineer’s view, safety engineer’s view). It is 
necessary to guaranty the consistence of these different views. 
3. Requirement engineering is a critical process in system engineering. So, 
safety requirements and their traceability need a particular attention. 
Taking into account these constraints allows to improve complex system 
development and to overcome the limitation and weakness (Rasmussen, 1997) of the 
actual safety evaluation processes. 
Requirements engineering (RE) (Sommerville, 2006) is a critical system 
engineering process (Juristo et al, 2002). It is a key problem area in the development 
of complex systems (Brooks, 1987). A common classification defines two types of 
requirements; functional and non-functional (Robertson and Robertson, 2006). 
Functional requirements describe the services that the system should provide. Non-
functional requirements are related to emergent system properties (such as safety) and 
cannot be attributed to a single system component. This shows the necessity of a 
global approach for safety management, from the requirements definition to the 
system verification and validation, which is fundamental for the success of the system 
design project. 
To deal with these different aspects, we propose a global approach for safety 
analysis. Indeed, safety must be addressed as a global property and safety 
requirements (Gotel and Finkelstein, 1994) must be formulated not only in the small 
(sub-system level) but in the large (system level).  Two aspects of requirements 
engineering are considered: the requirements development (including elicitation 
(Goguen and Linde, 1993), documentation, analysis and validation processes), and the 
requirements management (including maintainability management, changes 
management and requirements traceability processes (Parviainen and al, 2004)). 
 A literature review shows some works that attempt to address the safety evaluation 
of complex system. For example, safety standards (as the ARP-4754) are useful to 
understand activities related to safety evaluation, but they don’t define a unified 
approach with the nominal conception activities. This means that safety activities are 
not integrated in the system engineering processes. Recent projects like ESACS 
(Bozzano & al., 2003), ISAAC (Akerlund, 2006), ASSERT (Conquet, 2008) which 
deal with safety of complex systems don’t provide a real global approach. They are 
focused on methods and tools that can be used in safety evaluation. In other works 
like those presented in (Leveson & al., 2007), in addition to the fact that safety 
aspects are separated from the design activities, the proposed methodology is clearly 
oriented to software domain. 
This paper presents two aspects of our work on safety evaluation of complex 
system. The first part concerns the integration of safety management in system 
engineering process. The objective is to help engineers by proposing a new approach 
based on system engineering best practices. It uses the recommendation of the system 
engineering standard EIA-632 (Guillerm and al, 2010). 
The second part presents an information model based on SysML language (Sanford 
and al, 2009) to address requirements definition and their traceability (Gotel and 
Finkelstein, 1994), (Sahraoui, 2005) towards the solution elements and the V&V 
(Verification and Validation) elements. Safety requirements are integrated on RE 
activities, including management activities related to maintenance, and traceability.  
The paper is structured into five sections. The second section introduces the design 
framework. The integration approach is then presented in the third section. In the 
fourth section, the information model is proposed for efficient management of safety 
requirements. The last section gives some conclusions and future works. 
2 The systems engineering framework for complex system 
development 
System engineering is a methodical and disciplined approach for the design, 
realization, technical management, operations, and retirement of a system. It is a 
collaborative and interdisciplinary process of resolution of problems, supporting 
knowledge, methods and techniques resulting from the sciences and experiment for 
defining a system. System engineering concepts are adequate specifically for complex 
problems; research issues undergone can bring a solution (Sahraoui and al, 2004). 
In this part, we introduce some concepts of system engineering and the standard 
EIA-632 which are the basis of our safety global approach.  
2.1 System engineering concepts 
System engineering (SE) is the application of scientific and engineering efforts to 
transform an operational need into a design solution, with a description of system 
performance parameters and system configurations, through an iterative process of 
definition, synthesis, analysis, design, test and evaluation. SE is an interdisciplinary 
approaches that: 
1. Encompasses the scientific and engineering efforts related to the development, 
manufacturing, verification, deployment, operations, support and disposal of 
systems products and processes. 
2. Develops needed user training, equipment, procedures and data. 
3. Establishes and maintains configuration management of the system. 
4. Develops work breakdown structures and statements of work, and provides 
information for management decision-making. 
 
SE is an appropriate combination of methods and tools for suitable methodological 
process and systems management procedures. 
 
We distinguish three levels in SE, as illustrated in Figure 1. 
The first level, “SE processes”, focus on high-level issues, high-level requirements 
such as business needs and strategic needs and methods. 
The second level, “SE methodologies and methods”, deals with all technical issues 
such as systems requirements and design methodologies. 
The third level, “SE tools or technologies”, covers the implementation issues 
concerning the tools to be used, the required technologies to respond to the various 
assets of requirements such as reliability costs, maintainability and enabling 
technologies. 
 
 
Fig.1. Three levels of system engineering.  
These entities, such as processes, methods and tools, are the conceptual basis of 
our approach taken from SE best practice. In the first step, the processes can be 
identified with respect to the accumulated know-how. The second step concerns the 
methods to be used. The methods can be either developed or may be existing 
methods. Implementing the process, one method cannot be chosen for its flexibility or 
popularity, but only if it reflects the semantics of the process. No taxonomy has yet 
been developed for corresponding processes and methods. The third step concerns the 
tools that do not correspond to the processes but to the methods; hence in this 
approach we cannot use a tool to implement a process without first identifying the 
associated methods. 
2.2 EIA-632 standard  
The beginnings of systems engineering can be traced back to the Bell Telephone 
Laboratories in the 1940s (Auyang, 2004). Thirty years later, the first U.S. military 
standard was published (MIL-STD-499A, 1969.). It is focused on systems 
engineering, providing the first definition of the scope of engineering management. 
Nowadays, the standard ANSI/EIA-632 “Processes for Engineering a System”, which 
provides a typical systems engineering Work Breakdown Structure (Valerdi and 
Wheaton, 2005), is one famous standard, currently used in the industrial and military 
fields. This standard covers the product life-cycle from the needs capture to the 
transfer to the user. The processes are well described by the following Electronic 
Industries Alliance (EIA) standard (Figure 2). It is constituted by 13 processes (EIA-
632, 1999) covering the management issues, the supply/acquisition, design and 
requirement, verification and validation processes: 
1. Technical management processes (three processes): these processes monitor the 
whole process ranging from the initial idea to building a system until the delivery 
of the system. 
2. Acquisition and supply processes (two processes): these processes ensure the 
supply and acquisition (and are very close to logistics). 
3. System design processes (two processes): these processes deal with the elicitation 
and the acquisition of requirements and their modelling, the definition of the 
logical design and its physical solution. 
4. Product realisation processes (two processes): these processes deal with the 
implementation issues of the system design and its use. 
5. Technical evaluation processes (four processes): these processes deal with 
verification, validation and testing issues. 
 
 
Fig.2. System engineering processes (source EIA-632) 
In the work presented in this paper, we focus on the system design process and the 
technical evaluation process. Note that other processes will be considered in future 
works. 
3 Integration approach 
As said in the introduction, safety of complex systems relies heavily on the 
emergent properties. System Engineering is an ideal framework for the design of 
complex systems and the need for systems engineering arose with the increasing 
complexity of systems and projects.  
This work for safety integration in SE processes (system engineering approach) is 
based on the assumption that the safety property can only be treated adequately in 
their entirety, taking into account all variables, social and technical aspects (Kotovsky 
and al, 1985). This basis for system engineering has been stated in the principle that a 
system is more than the sum of its parts. The starting point of the work presented in 
this paper is the following note provided in EIA-632 standard: 
Note: Standard does not purport to address all safety problems associated with its 
use or all applicable regulatory requirements. It is the responsibility of the user of 
this Standard to establish appropriate safety and health practices and to determine 
the applicability of regulatory limitations before its use. (EIA-632, 1999). 
 
So, following this note, this section provides the approach that aims to guide 
designers in addressing safety problems. It describes for each process, how the safety 
must be considered.  
Note that, in reference to SE chain, the proposed approach is illustrated in term of 
process, which must be defined independently to methods and/or tools. Other projects 
are focused on methods and tools (see (Akerlund, 2006) and (Bozzano and al, 2003) 
for example). 
The Safety management must follow all steps (processes) of SE from the 
requirements definition to the verification and the validation of the system. This paper 
is focused only on:  
• System Design processes in which we address requirements definition 
processes and the solution definition processes. 
• Technical Evaluation processes with the system analysis process, the 
requirements validation process and the system verification process. 
The implementation of the approach consists in identifying and indicating how 
safety must be considered for each sub-processes of EIA-632. 
3.1 System design processes 
The System Design Processes are used to convert agreed-upon requirements of the 
acquirer into a set of realizable products that satisfy acquirer and other stakeholder 
requirements (EIA-632, 1999).  Two processes are involved:  the Requirements 
Definition process and the Solution Definition process. The interaction between these 
processes is shown in Figure 3. 
3.1.1 Requirement definition process 
The objective of the Requirements Definition Process is to transform the 
stakeholder requirements into a set of technical requirements. For functional and non-
functional requirements, if this distinction is not possible at the requirement elicitation 
process level, an analysis may be done in order to categorize requirements. Two types 
of requirements are defined: the Stakeholder Requirements and the System Technical 
Requirements. 
Concerning Stakeholder Requirements, the developer shall define a validated set of 
acquirer requirements for the system, or portion thereof. 
Generally, safety requirements correspond to constraints in the system. It is 
necessary to identify and collect all constraints imposed by acquirer to obtain a safe 
system. A hierarchical organization associates weight to safety requirements, 
following their criticality. 
For Technical Requirements, the developer shall define a validated set of system 
requirements from the validated sets of stakeholder requirements. For safety 
requirements, the system technical requirements traduce system performances. It 
consists on defining safety attributes (Determine risk tolerability, SIL level, MTBF, 
MTTR for example).  
 
 
Fig.3. EIA-632 System design process.  
Safety requirements can be derived from different sources. The first source is the 
stakeholders. In this case classical requirements elicitation methods can be used 
(Coulin and al, 2005). The second source is constituted by standards which guide 
designer to define safety requirements. For example, safety critical systems within the 
civil aerospace sector are developed subject to the recommendations outlined in 
(ARP-4754, 1996) and (ARP-4761, 1996). These standards give guidance on the 
‘determination’ of requirements, including requirements capture, requirements types 
and derived requirements. The third source is outputs of risk analysis. The identified 
hazards are evaluated in terms of likelihood and severity by means of risk assessment. 
Architectural design decisions are then made upon choosing appropriate risk 
mitigation strategies or actions, and safety requirements are defined in response to the 
chosen mitigation mechanisms (Wu and Kelly, 2006). 
When requirements are defined, it is possible to define some attributes to facilitate 
their management, for example with an expression of requirements using SysML 
(SysML, 2006), (Bock, 2006) or UML 2 (Friedenthal and Kobryn, 2004). It is 
possible to link requirements to the design solution. This point will be presented in the 
4th section. 
3.1.2 Solution Definition Process 
The Solution Definition Process is used to generate an acceptable design solution.  
For Logical Solution Representations, the developer shall define one or more 
validated sets of logical solution representations that conform with the technical 
requirements of the system. Formal or semi-formal models (UML, SysML, Petri net, 
finite-state machine…) are recommended in this process for the solution modeling. 
The use of formal methods allows the automation of verification and analysis. In this 
processes, safety analysis techniques will be used to determine the best logical 
solution. 
The Physical Solution Representations are derived from logical solution 
representation and must respect all requirements, particularly safety requirements. 
The same safety analysis may be done when the physical solution representation is 
available. The same recommendations than for logical solution remain true. However, 
when approaching the physical solution, it appears that the semantics of SysML does 
not seem quite complete. So it is possible to use architecture languages such as AADL 
(Aer, 2004), VHDL-AMS (Verries and al, 2008) (Vhd, 1999), SystemC-AMS… 
As this design process progresses, details of the system are obtained. So, the 
hazards analysis will be refined and new hazards may emerge. The Chosen 
mitigations may themselves bring new safety problems. Therefore, new risk 
mitigation actions may need to be identified and safety requirements refined. The 
process evolves (see System design process) until all identified hazards have been 
mitigated sufficiently in an acceptable manner. 
3.2 Technical Evaluation Processes 
The Technical Evaluation Processes are intended to be invoked by one of the other 
processes for engineering a system. Four processes are involved: Systems Analysis, 
Requirements Validation, System Verification, and End Products Validation. The 
relationship between these processes is shown in Figure 4. 
3.2.1 System Analysis Process 
The Systems Analysis Process is used to: (1) provide a rigorous basis for technical 
decision making, resolution of requirement conflicts, and assessment of alternative 
physical solutions; (2) determine progress in satisfying system technical and derived 
technical requirements; (3) support risk management; and (4) ensure that decisions are 
made only after evaluating the cost, schedule, performance, and risk effects on the 
engineering or reengineering of the system (EIA-632, 1999). 
In this process safety is involved at each item. Indeed, (1) in the case of 
requirement conflict, higher priority requirements must be safety ones. These 
requirements are used in the assessment of alternative physical solutions. (2) The 
designer has to determine the satisfaction of system technical requirements and 
derived technical safety requirements. The interest of using semi formal model for 
requirement traceability analysis becomes obvious. (3) The risk management is used 
to develop risk management strategies of the design project. (4) Safety aspect can 
generate additional cost. The designer has to evaluate this cost. 
 
 Fig.4. Technical evaluation processes 
3.2.2 Requirements Validation Process 
Requirements Validation is critical to successful system product development and 
implementation. Requirements are validated when it is certain that they describe the 
input requirements and objectives such that the resulting system products can satisfy 
them.   
In this process, a great attention is given to traceability analysis, which allows 
verifying all the links among Stakeholder Requirements, Technical and Derived 
Technical Requirements, and Logical Solution Representations. Like other 
requirements, safety requirements must be validated.  
Frequently, specifications are written in natural language and are the base of the 
design, test and validation phases. The natural language can be ambiguous. The 
consequence is that the requirements can be differently interpreted. It is thus 
necessary to propose a method of progressive refinement of the requirements towards 
models with known semantics allowing their formalization.  
To facilitate the step of requirements validation, semi-formal solutions, like UML 
(Booch and al, 1998) or SysML (Bock, 2006) can be used for good formulation of 
requirements. Indeed, the diversity of people concerned by design project can have 
limited knowledge concerning the structure of the future system, that’s why industry-
scale requirement engineering projects are so hard. Thus, the UML or SysML 
languages, with their different diagrams, can be helpful. 
3.2.3 System Verification Process 
The System Verification Process is used to ascertain that the generated system 
design solution is consistent with its source requirements, in particular, safety 
requirements.  
In case of safety verification, when the agreement between designers and safety 
teams is obtained, a last safety analysis called System Safety Assessment (SSA) is 
done to consolidate the product from the safety point of view. Some traceability 
models allow defining the procedure of verifying safety requirement. These 
procedures are planned at the definition of safety requirement. Simulation (Zeigler 
and al, 2000) is an appropriate method that can be used to achieve system verification. 
Other methods like test, virtual prototyping or model checking are also used. 
4 Information model 
Requirements engineering is an important phase in a system design. It is important 
to perform it correctly for project success (Juristo et al, 2002). This activity is difficult 
in case of complex systems. Requirements formalization can help the designers in 
their requirements engineering activities. The introduction of models can be useful to 
achieve the formalization task. Model-driven engineering, in which models are the 
main artifact during system development, is an emergent approach that tries to 
address system complexity by the intensive use of models. In this part we present an 
information model based on SysML to properly define and manage requirements and 
particularly safety requirements. 
4.1 Requirements management 
In complex systems engineering, an important number of documents is produced 
specially during the system definition phase. Statistical studies show that the success 
of a project depends strongly on the definition and the management of requirements. 
Requirements management allows to collect requirements, to facilitate their 
expression, and to validate them. It must also ensure that each requirement is properly 
declined, allocated, monitored, satisfied, made verifiable, verified and justified. 
Figure 5 presents an overview of the requirements relationships as defined in the 
EIA-632 standard. The proposed information model follows this pattern. We see that 
other stakeholder requirements, when added to the acquirer requirements, make up a 
set of stakeholder requirements that are transformed into system technical 
requirements. The logical and physical solution representations are derived from 
technical requirements. Design solution and specified requirements are defined by 
completing the solution definition Process. 
 
 
Fig.5. Requirements relationships: EIA-632 model. 
4.2 Role of the information model 
The information model can be considered as a database used to share and capitalize 
knowledge. It is accessible for the persons involved in the design project and aims to 
guide the design process. It is also used to manage requirements changes, and then 
evaluating the project progress.  
When different views exist in the design team as it is often the case (design 
engineer’s view, safety engineer’s view for example) the information model makes 
the system more understandable as it is based on a common language. 
When transforming needs into system definition, modeling can help to properly 
achieve this task. Indeed, during this transformation, we will gradually go from 
abstract concepts to a rigorous definition of the system.  
In modeling, there are 2 separate areas: the problem area and the possible solutions 
area. At the beginning of the project, the representation of the problem area is more 
important than the representation of the possible solutions area. During the progress 
of the design, representation of possible solutions area will be enriched to achieve the 
strict definition of the system. In parallel the overall representation of the problem 
area will be enriched to better define the expectations of the system 
(needs/requirements) and will stabilize itself. The transition between the problem 
domain and the solution domain is a very delicate point of system engineering. It must 
be expressed by allocating requirements/properties/constraints on possible solutions. 
These allocations will generate traceability links, which are crucial for the system 
verification and validation activities. We propose an information model, based on 
SysML language that will be compatible with the requirements management of the 
standard EIA-632, to takes into account safety and risk management aspects.  
4.3 Systems Modeling Language (SysML) 
SysML is a systems modeling language that supports specification, analysis, 
design, verification and validation of a broad range of complex systems. The language 
is an evolution of UML 2.0 and is defined for systems that may include hardware, 
software, information, processes and personnel. It aims to facilitate the 
communication between heterogeneous teams (mechanical, electrical and software 
engineers for instance). The language is effective in specifying requirements, 
architecture, and behavior. It allows the allocation of elements to models and the 
definition of constraints on system properties to support engineering analysis. SysML 
allows the modeling and supports different views: 
• The requirements view: using requirements diagram and use case diagram, 
• The structure view: based on block diagram (internal/external), 
• The behaviour view: using statechart diagram, activity diagram, and 
sequence diagram, 
• The constraints view: with parametric diagram. 
SysML seems to be an excellent candidate for a common language. It allows 
sharing specifications of a complex system between different trades, between design 
engineers and safety engineers in our case. SysML allows expressing the requirements 
using the requirements diagram. It also defines some relationships that link a given 
requirement to other requirements or elements of the model. With SysML, it is 
possible to have: 
•  A definition of hierarchy between requirements,  
• requirement derivation,  
• requirement satisfaction by a model element,  
• requirement verification by a test case (TestCase) or  
• requirement refinement. 
 
With SysML we can create traceability links between requirements and system 
components. These links allow performing impact analysis of requirements change or 
modification. Thus, it is possible to assess the consequences of a requirement change 
on the system safety using the links defined between requirements, functions and 
components.  
4.4 SysML Extension 
The SysML language proposes basic concepts (like requirements or blocks) for 
which some attributes are associated. The Semantic of SysML is enriched through the 
extension mechanism, in order to adapt it to our approach. We define more detailed 
requirement element, several types of requirements, and also additional traceability 
links. 
4.4.1 Enriched requirement 
The concept of requirement is fundamental in system design. In SysML a specific 
diagram is dedicated to requirements with a possibility to define traceability links for 
requirements. The objective is to guide the development (by linking needs to the 
design solution) and to facilitate the verification and validation phase or the 
management of requirements changes. Figure 6 shows SysML stereotype requirement 
definition. Requirement in SysML is composed by two attributes: an identifier (Id) and 
the description of the requirement (Text).  
 
 
Fig.6. The requirement stereotype in 
The definition of stereotype requirement is enriched in order to adapt it for our 
need.  This is done by adding some new attributes that are inspired form the RPM 
profile (Requirement Profile for MeMVaTEx) (Albinet and al, 2008), the 
recommendation of AFIS (the French association of system engineering) (AFIS, 
2005) and the Snow Card Volere (Roberston, 2010). As shown in the Figure 7, these 
attributes are: 
• Category: shows if the requirement is functional or non-functional (reliability, 
availability, safety, performance, cost or maintainability…), 
• Justification: description of the justification of the requirement (why this 
requirement?), 
• Source: acquirer, other stakeholder, standard, regulatory authorities, risk 
analysis, 
• Target: end product or enabling products (development, production, test, 
deployment, training, support or disposal product…), 
• Maturity: to inform about the life phase (or status) of the requirement: 
original, defined, validated or verified, 
• Criticality: low, medium or high, used to characterize the importance of the 
requirement in terms of risk, 
• Flexibility: low, medium or high, 
• Priority: low, medium or high, used to differentiate a mandatory requirement 
from an optional one. 
 
 
Fig.7. Proposed requirement model 
4.4.2 New requirement Stereotypes  
Stereotypes allow extending the semantic of SysML. They allow defining new 
types of blocks. 
We define new stereotypes for requirements (see Figure 8). These stereotypes are 
based on the classification of requirements in system engineering (particularly in the 
standard EIA-632, see figure 5). So, it is possible to create and define requirements of 
“acquirerReqt”, “otherStakeholderReqt”, “systemTechnicalReqt” or “specifiedReqt” 
stereotype. These new requirements stereotypes facilitate the distinction between the 
different types of requirements. 
  
Fig.8. Requirements stereotypes 
4.4.3 Risk stereotype 
Concerning safety requirements, which can be derived from risk analysis, a block 
risk is defined and is linked to safety requirements (see figure 9). In fact, 
identification of risks is the starting point for many studies about safety/reliability. 
Thus, defining a block “risk” in the information model and linking it to the safety 
requirements, allows to improve the comprehension of the presence of some safety 
requirements and to justify them. The ultimate objective is to improve the safety 
analysis of the system.  
 
 
 
Fig.9. From risk to safety requirements  
4.5 Presentation of the information model  
As said previously, the information model is based on SysML and follows the SE 
process (EIA-632 standard). It is considered as the "system" knowledge basis of the 
design project, allowing data sharing between all different trades (mechanical, 
hydraulic, thermal, electrical...). Therefore, it is intended to model the "system" level, 
showing the interactions between the system and its environment and also the 
connections between subsystems. The 3 basic concepts of system design are: 
requirements, design solution and V&V (Validation and Verification). All these 
concepts are included and represented in the information model. 
Safety authorities impose a separation of system design concepts (requirements, 
design solution and V&V). They must be developed independently. From this 
observation, the proposed approach allows the expression of these concepts, with a 
clear separation between them. However Traceability mechanisms are provided to 
link these concepts in order to facilitate impacts analysis. We propose a way to use 
SysML that allows structuring the elements of the design project with respect to the 
concepts separation (see Figure 10). In other words, our approach allows a rigorous 
organization of the project design. Indeed, different diagrams manage different 
concepts. 
 
 
Fig.10. Package diagram of concepts separation 
In the information model (Figure 11), we can see that all types of requirements are 
represented. We see that they follow the EIA-632 standard recommendations. All 
traceability links required by the EIA-632 are present in this model, and the 
distinction between logical solution (functional part) and physical solution 
(component part) appears. 
 
 
Fig.11. Information model  
In this model, we highlight the definition of interfaces, which are components 
themselves and which links several components together. The concept of interface is 
essential for a proper system design. Indeed, some problems encountered during 
development can result from a bad definition of interfaces. 
The last important element included in this model, other than requirement and 
solution element, is the "TestCase". These elements of V&V are included in the 
model to be directly connected to the requirements that must be satisfied by the 
TestCase. 
5. Conclusion  
In this paper we presented a new approach for safety evaluation of complex 
systems. The contribution consists of two main points. The first one concerns the 
integration of safety in system engineering processes. The proposed methodology is 
based on EIA-632 system engineering standard and aims to help engineers involved 
in a design project to manage the safety aspect of the system in parallel to other 
design activities. It allows an explicit consideration of safety in systems engineering 
process by defining the specific activities related to safety.  All system engineering 
processes, from requirements definition process to verification and validation process, 
are concerned by the integration approach. As the approach is based on the EIA-632 
standard and follows the different processes and sub-processes of this one, it can be 
incorporated easily into systems engineering concepts. This gives a framework for 
safety management showing that the SE concepts are adequate, specifically for 
complex problems. 
 
Requirements engineering is a crucial activity in the design of complex system. 
The second contribution of the paper is the proposition and the definition of an 
information model based on the SysML language. It is done by an extension of this 
language by adding new stereotypes and new attributes to requirements. We also 
defined new links (specify and treat) between specified requirements and the elements 
of the model. 
The proposed information model allows the expression of the handled concepts 
(requirements, design solution and V&V), and the creation of traceability links 
between these concepts in order to facilitate the comprehension and/or the impacts 
analysis. The proposed approach formalizes the practice of systems engineering 
through the use of models. The objective is to improve quality/productivity and to 
reduce risk by introducing rigor, precision, and communications among 
system/project stakeholders and managing complexity. 
The approach is demonstrated through an example from aeronautic domain and 
presented in (Guillerm, 2011). However, the approach needs an additional work for its 
validation and application. 
Future work will consist on considering other EIA-632 processes. Indeed in the 
present paper we considered only the processes of system design and evaluation. The 
consideration of processes like technical management or acquisition and supply will 
complete the integration approach. 
With regard to information model, we are studying the interest of using OCL 
(object constraint language) in order to formalize the requirements. The objective is to 
integrate this possibility in the information model. Another point concerns the 
definition of some analysis from the information model, such as the generation of 
traceability matrix. 
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